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LAWMAKING AND INTERPRETATION:
THE ROLE OF A FEDERAL JUDGE IN
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN*
Introduction by Dean Joseph D. Kearney
It is my privilege to welcome you to our annual E. Harold Hallows Lecture.
On an annual basis a distinguished jurist spends a day or two within the Law
School community. This is our Hallows Judicial Fellow, and the highlight of the
visit is this Hallows Lecture.
It is appropriate to begin by recalling briefly the individual in whose memory
this lecture stands. E. Harold Hallows was a member of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court from 1958 to 1974 and was Chief Justice during the last six of those years.
This service during a time of significant changes in legal doctrine itself merits
remembrance. For an even longer time, though, Justice Hallows was Professor
Hallows at Marquette University Law School-indeed, for twenty-eight years
before his appointment to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Year after year, Chief
Justice Hallows taught Equity and Equity II to future Marquette lawyers; he made
time for this undertaking even in the midst of his practice in Milwaukee and his
extensive public service.
This year's Hallows Lecturer is the Honorable Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain,
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judge
O'Scannlain is a native of New York and attended St. John's University there for
college and Harvard for law school After a two-year stint as a tax attorney on his
native East Coast, Judge O'Scannlain moved across the country to Portland,
Oregon. There he alternated between private practice and government service, the
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I
would like to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Brian P. Morrissey, my law clerk, in
helping to prepare these remarks.
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latter including positions as Oregon's public utility commissioner and director of
the state's department of environmental quality. In 1986, he was nominated to his
current position on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by
President Ronald Reagan and in short order confirmed to that post by the United
States Senate. I wish to make sure that I note, given Chief Justice Hallows's
connection with the Law School (as I have described), that Judge O'Scannlain
makes time every year to teach a semester-long course at Lewis & Clark's law
school in Portland.
Over the past couple of decades, Judge O'Scannlain has emerged as a leader
on the Ninth Circuit. This includes the court's most important work, its cases,
where Judge O'Scannlain plays an unusually important role not only in his own
docket but also in the court's en-banc process. An O'Scannlain dissent from denial
of en-banc rehearing frequently gets some attention across the country-in
Washington, D.C. He is also otherwise engaged with the court, having been for
many years the leading proponent, perhaps, and certainly within the court, of
disaggregating the Ninth Circuit into two or more smaller circuits. He is willing to
disagree with prevailing wisdom without being disagreeable-to my mind one of
the most important attributes that a judge (or lawyer) can possess. It is also a
valuable attribute for a young lawyer-say, a law clerk-to be able to observe early
in his career.
Please join me in welcoming to Marquette Law School this year's Hallows
Lecturer, the Honorable Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain.
Thank you for inviting me to speak with you this afternoon. It is a
pleasure to visit this distinguished law school, especially since it is under
the superb leadership of my former law clerk, Dean Joseph Kearney,
whom I thank for his warm introduction and for his very kind invitation
to be with you for these days.
As I have learned, the Hallows lecture is always delivered by a jurist.
As a consequence, I would like to take this opportunity to explore with
you the proper role of a federal judge in our constitutional framework.
All of us who have observed the increasingly combative judicial
confirmation hearings in the U.S. Senate in recent years are quite aware
that it has become popular for Americans of all political persuasions to
applaud the values of "judicial restraint" while criticizing so-called
"activist judges." But what, precisely, do we mean by "judicial
restraint" and "judicial activism," and why is the former to be
preferred? More importantly, is the definition of a judicial activist
simply a matter of political taste, or is there a principled basis upon
which we can distinguish those jurists who faithfully exercise their
constitutional function from those who succumb to the ever-present
temptation to legislate from the bench?
I believe such a principled basis does exist, and I suggest that judicial
restraint, properly understood, reserves for judges only those
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responsibilities inherent in the judicial branch of a tripartite system of
separated powers. As all students of American government are aware,
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches perform different
functions and thus, require different skills of their members. I would
argue that some of the qualities that make the very best legislators-
ingenuity, the willingness to take risks, and a creative approach to
problem solving-are exceedingly dangerous in the hands of judges, yet
lamentably common.
Before going further, I must emphasize that I speak only for myself,
and not for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
the court of which I am a member. In addition, I must also stress that
these thoughts should not be construed as opining on the outcome of
any matter that may come before me. Rather, my goal is to
demonstrate how different philosophies judges bring to their job of
deciding cases can advance or undermine the principle of separation of
powers, as illustrated by several important cases in our history.
I will begin this discussion with the role of the federal judge as
envisioned by the Framers of our Constitution. Next, I will suggest
which theoretical approach is more consistent with that vision by
examining cases in which federal judges have employed different
approaches to constitutional and statutory interpretation. At the
conclusion of that endeavor, I hope to demonstrate that a judicial
philosophy that relies on text, structure, and history is not only
consistent with what the Framers envisioned, and therefore possessed of
historical legitimacy, but, more importantly, that such a philosophy is
essential to the maintenance of a vibrant democracy, in which the
people shape the policy that determines their future, rather than a robed
elite ruling from the federal bench.
I.
It might be said that the primary responsibility of a judge is to
decipher legal text in a case or controversy that comes before him or
her. Every day, we are presented with statutes and asked to answer two
important questions. First, we are asked to determine whether the
substance of the contested legislation conflicts with superceding
provisions of the United States Constitution. Second, and far more
often, we are asked to interpret the meaning of a legal text the parties
dispute.
The approach a federal judge brings to this task has critical
implications for our system of separated powers. Article I, Section 1 of
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the United States Constitution makes clear that "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
Correspondingly, Article III extends the judicial power to specific
"cases" and "controversies." 1 Thus, the Constitution places the power
to legislate-to create law-in the people's elected representatives. The
judicial power, on the other hand, is merely a power of interpretation-
the power to discern how a particular law applies to a specific set of
facts. The Constitution entrusts this power to an unelected, life-tenured
federal judiciary and, in my view, does so with good reason. The power
to interpret requires judgment, careful study, and most importantly,
independence, qualities best cultivated in public servants at least one
step removed from the political sphere.
The success of this system of government, however, hinges on the
judge's ability to apply the judicial power as it is, a power to interpret-
to determine how a law applies to the facts of a particular case, not to
speculate as to how that legal text should apply, or how the legislators
who crafted it would have wanted it to apply in the case before the
judge. The former exercise applies law, the latter creates it, and the
power to legislate is wholly absent from the judicial powers set forth in
Article III.
The Framers' writings illustrate why a judiciary confined to the task
of interpretation is essential to a structure of separated powers. The
system of government we enjoy today was influenced to an
underappreciated degree by the French political philosopher Baron de
Montesquieu, an Enlightenment thinker who first articulated the theory
of a tripartite system of government. Montesquieu described the
concentration of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the same
hands as the definition of tyranny itself, and the American states took
u.1.9 0 0 4il
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Paper No. 78 described the judiciary as the weakest branch in the new
government, but quickly cautioned that the stability of this arrangement,
and thus the "general liberty of the people" was contingent upon the
judiciary remaining "truly distinct" from both the legislative and
executive branches, for while "liberty can have nothing to fear from the
judiciary alone," he wrote, "[it] would have every thing to fear from its
union with either of the other departments."
4
Acting on the same insights, the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention rejected three separate proposals which would have given
the Supreme Court an integral role in the legislative process. First, the
delegates rejected a plan to establish a Council of Revision-a
committee composed of federal judges and executive branch officials
which would have been empowered to review and to amend legislative
bills.5 Second, the delegates declined the suggestion to create a Privy
Council composed of various executive department heads along with the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, which would have produced written
opinions on legal issues and provided other assistance upon the
President's order.6 Finally, the Convention refused to adopt proposed
language that would have authorized executive departments to obtain
advisory opinions from the Supreme Court.7
This history demonstrates that in the system of government
envisioned by the Framers and later ratified into our Constitution, the
role of the judge is simply to judge-to interpret legislation rather than
taking any active role in the creation of law itself.
Few, if any, students of the law would dispute this characterization
of the judicial power. But, dissension soon erupts when the question
becomes how a judge is faithfully to apply this power. Keeping in mind
such definition of the judicial role in our constitutional framework, let us
turn to this important debate.
II.
As I noted earlier, a federal judge regularly deals with legal text in
cases before him. And, while issues of constitutional interpretation may
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 499; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 81, (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 543-44.
6. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 328-29, 342-44
(1911).
7. Id. at 334 (the proposal would have provided that "[e]ach Branch of the Legislature,
as well as the supreme Executive shall have authority to require the opinions of the supreme
Judicial Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.").
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grab the most headlines, the overwhelming majority of a judge's
workload is consumed with construing federal statutes.8 In examining
judges' approaches to this task, scholars have divided the various
theories of interpretation into two broad categories. The first uses the
text of the provision at issue as the point of departure and considers that
text in light of structure and history in order to derive its meaning. The
second theory focuses instead on the purpose the enacting legislature
had in mind when it drafted the provision and attempts to derive an
interpretation consistent with it. Thus, perhaps not surprisingly,
scholars have labeled these theories as "textualism" and "purposivism,"
respectively. 9
Both theories are designed with the same goal in mind-to equip
judges with the tools necessary to interpret the law in the manner most
consistent with the enacting legislature's will, and thus preserve our
lawmaking process as one controlled by elected representatives rather
than the courts. Yet as I hope to demonstrate, only one of these
theories is capable of achieving this goal, while the other, I suggest,
directly undermines it.
8. The common law-the process by which judges essentially create law in the absence
of a statute or other controlling authority-still governs a substantial body of state law. Yet
in the federal courts (with one very limited exception) the common law does not exist. That
exception is known as "federal common law." In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the
Supreme Court famously announced that "[t]here is no federal general common law." 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Still, the Court has also explained that "federal common law"-federal
rules of decision whose content is not derived from specific federal statutes or constitutional
provisions-governs several small pockets of a federal court's jurisdiction. See RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003). These pockets include cases involving the rights and obligations
of the United States, see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), disputes
between states, see, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838), cases
that implicate international relations, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964), and admiralty, see, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77,
95-96 (1981). Importantly, federal common law is not a body of law that applies in federal
courts but not state courts. Rather, the established theory suggests that federal common law
preempts contrary state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1,
cl. 2. For an overview of the competing modern definitions of federal common law, and the
tensions between them, see Jay Tidmarsh and Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common
Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585 (2006).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
3 (2006); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348 (2005). Of course, the
labels of "textualism" and "purposivism" are highly simplistic, but for the purposes of
discussion, let us allow ourselves to remain at this level of generality. Consistent with what
has become modern practice, I use the term "purposivism" as a synonym for intentionalism.
However, some have distinguished the two approaches to interpretation. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 25-26 (1994).
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A.
Although judges have relied on text for as long as there have been
courts, "textualism" as a theory is of relatively new vintage. It is
traceable to a backlash by a group of intellectuals against what they
perceived to be the liberal and activist advances of the Warren Court.' °
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, the most well-known proponent
of the theory, outlined its foundational principles in his famous Tanner
Lectures at Princeton." Justice Scalia suggests that in order to reserve
the task of lawmaking to the people's representatives, judges must limit
themselves to objective sources of meaning, such as text, structure, and
history.'2 Thus, while judges following this approach may consider what
Congress intended a particular word or phrase to mean, they only search
for this intent in an objective sense. A hypothetical person guides this
analysis. As Justice Scalia explained, the goal of the judge should be to
discern "the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text
of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris."'3  In
other words, the judge does not ask what the statute's words mean to
him or her alone, but what they would mean to "'a skilled, objectively
reasonable user of words'" alive at the time of the statute's enactment.
In practice, this means that the judge first examines the language of
the statutory provision at issue, followed by the context of the entire
statute, relying, if necessary, upon so-called linguistic canons to
elucidate the meaning of ambiguous terms. Finally, the judge will
consider history-the manner in which the statute's terms have been
used in other laws, or the contemporary meaning ascribed to those
terms at the time the statute was passed, as dictionaries and other
sources may reveal.'5
On the other hand, judges who aim to interpret a statute consistently
with Congress's purpose begin from a very different starting point.
10. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 641-50
(1990); Molot, supra note 9, at 24-25.
11. Justice Scalia's lectures, delivered in 1995, were later collected and published in
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
12. Id. at 17.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 434 (2005)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59,61 (1988)).
15. A brief glance at the Supreme Court's most recent decisions reveal the great
assistance dictionaries can offer in interpreting a statute. See Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,
127 S. Ct. 2301, 2307 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1755 n.11
(2007); James v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1586, 1597 n.5 (2007).
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While a judge focused on text asks what a reasonable person would
understand the language of a statute to say, a judge focused on purpose
asks what Congress meant to accomplish. 6 The sources such judges rely
on are myriad. For example, while they consider all the same sources as
textualists-plain meaning, statutory context, and linguistic canons-
they also include many others, such as the evolution of the statutory
scheme, new practices and norms, and especially legislative history. 7 By
expanding the universe of relevant sources, these judges greatly increase
their discretion and, in my view, allow themselves to encroach upon the
power the Constitution reserves to the political branches.
Perhaps the best-articulated justification of the purposivist approach
is Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer's recent book, Active
Liberty," which sets forth his philosophy and criticizes what he
perceives to be the weaknesses of over-reliance on text.' 9  Justice
Breyer's theory conceives of judging as a search for congressional intent
and, like the textualists, encourages judges to allow a hypothetical
person to guide their inquiry." This hypothetical person, however, is
not a "reasonable user of words," but a "reasonable member of
Congress."'" Further, this hypothetical congressperson does not require
the judge to determine how an ordinary citizen would interpret a
16. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 85-91 (2006).
17. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2042-43
(2006).
18. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005).
19. Justice Breyer's theory of "active liberty" is built on three principles: (1) judicial
restraint, (2) interpretation of text "as driven by purposes," and (3) likely consequences. Id.
at 17-18 (emphasis omitted). He explains that this theory of interpretation aims to increase
the attention courts pay to "modern liberty"-defined as the individual's freedom to pursue
his own interests, free of unnecessary government interference. Id. at 3-5 (citing Benjamin
Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns (1819), in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 309-28 (Biancamaria Fontana trans. & ed., 1988)).
In extolling judicial restraint, Justice Breyer reminds us that "even if a judge knows 'what
the just result should be,' that judge 'is not to substitute even his juster will' for that of 'the
people."' Id. at 17. Yet Justice Breyer also suggests that the judge should interpret statutes
in light of their "underlying purpose" and interpret the Constitution in light of the "great
purposes" which that document was intended to achieve. Id. at 17-18. He then concludes
that "judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, including
'contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected."'
Id. at 18.
Like Justice Breyer, I believe restraint is critical to a principled judicial philosophy. Yet,
in what follows, I suggest that an approach which allows judges to focus on purpose at the
expense of text vitiates such restraint and leaves judges to become lawmakers themselves.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id. at 88.
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statute, but how a reasonable member of the enacting Congress "would
have wanted" the court to interpret it.
22
Both hypothetical figures unquestionably afford judges some
discretion. Yet the discretion permitted by a text-based approach is
cabined by important restraints-the plain meaning of language,
statutory structure, canons of construction, and history. The
hypothetical reasonable member of Congress, however, invites judges to
embark on a far more creative endeavor. Indeed, if one merely asks
what a reasonable member of Congress was trying to say, there is little
to distinguish this inquiry from asking the judge what he thinks the
statute should say-in other words, legislating from the bench. 3
To contrast these two theories, let us turn to a concrete example.
B.
Three terms ago, the Supreme Court considered the case of Gary
Small, a defendant convicted and sentenced to five years in prison by a
Japanese court for attempting to smuggle firearms into that country.2
4
Shortly after his release, Small returned to the United States, where he
promptly purchased a handgun." After that, he was charged with and
convicted of violating a federal statute that prohibited the possession of
firearms by "any person ... who has been convicted in any court of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 2 6 On
appeal, he argued that the statute did not apply to him because
Congress only meant for the term "any court" to prohibit the possession
of firearms by defendants convicted in American courts. A 5-3 majority
(Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate) agreed with Small that
"any court" was limited to this narrower definition. Writing for the
majority, Justice Breyer noted that the plain language of the statute did
not explicitly "mention foreign convictions" or implicate a subject
matter such as immigration or terrorism, in which foreign convictions
would be "especially relevant., 27 Critical to his analysis was his insight
22. Id. at 88-91.
23. See SdALIA, supra note 11; Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive
Alternative to Textualism and Originalism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2405 (2006) (reviewing
STPEHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005)).
24. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 395 (2005).
25. Id. at 387, 396.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
27. Small, 544 U.S. at 391. Justice Breyer further noted that other sections of the statute
explicitly referred to "federal" and "state" convictions, and that, as such, Congress must have
meant "any court" to refer only to those two types of convictions, not "any" convictions as its
2008]
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that the natural reading of "any court" would create "anomalies" that,
at least in the majority's view, produced unfair or inequitable results.
Specifically, Justice Breyer worried that such a reading would permit
individuals convicted in foreign courts of conduct that our country
embraces (such as free speech) to be prosecuted under the statute, even
though those who engaged in the same conduct on American soil would
be immune."
The dissenters, led by Justice Thomas, were unmoved. Limiting
themselves to the "plain terms" of the statute, they reasoned that the
natural reading of the word "any" has "an expansive meaning.""
Consequently, they would have held that Small's foreign conviction was
within the scope of the statute. 0
What accounts for these divergent readings of this relatively simple
phrase? The majority made clear that the "anomalies" the term "any
court" would permit caused it to reject that reading. That is, they
concluded that because the statute's plain text would punish a person
even if he was convicted in a foreign court for "conduct that domestic
laws would permit," no reasonable member of Congress could have
meant "any court" to mean what it most naturally suggestsI
In my view, the majority presents some persuasive policy reasons as
to why a law that treats defendants convicted in foreign and domestic
courts identically may be undesirable. But I believe strongly that such
considerations are inappropriate for a judge faithfully exercising his
constitutional role. First, as the dissent aptly pointed out, the majority's
reading created its own anomalies. By limiting the definition of "any
court" to only domestic courts, the majority's interpretation permits
individuals convicted in foreign courts of violent crimes such as rape and
murder freely to possess firearms in the United States, even though
those convicted in domestic courts of entirely nonviolent crimes may
natural reading would suggest. Id. at 391-93 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2000)).
28. Id. at 391-92.
29. Id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that the word "any" has "an expansive
meaning, that is 'one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind"') (quoting United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIcTIONARY 97 (1976))).
30. Further, the dissent viewed the statute's structure differently than the majority,
concluding that the specific mention of "state" and "federal" convictions in other sections
confirmed their view that the term "any court" should be interpreted without qualification,
because Congress's explicit use of such term elsewhere demonstrated that it knew how to
specify such restrictions when it wanted to. Id. at 398.
31. Id. at 389-90.
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not.32
Thus, for me, the Small case exemplifies how the search for
Congress's supposed purpose exceeds judicial competence, and, I
suggest, judicial power. The Court in Small was forced to choose
between two readings of a statute, each of which would create
anomalies.33 Determining which anomalies are tolerable and which are
not is a project perfectly tailored to a legislative body vested with
factfinding expertise and accountability to the people. Yet courts have
no such expertise or accountability. The result reached by the majority
in Small may have been socially desirable. But the reality remains that
as judges, except when the most natural reading leads to
unconstitutional or (in a narrow set of cases) absurd results, our
responsibility is to apply the text as Congress wrote it, not to correct the
anomalies Congress failed to foresee.
C.
Judges who emphasize text are often criticized as "wooden," or
tone-deaf to practical consequences. My first response is that such
claim is overly simplistic, as textualism is not to be confused with
literalism. Rather, we should interpret words according to their most
reasonable meaning. Reasonableness presumes a limited range of
meanings, no interpretation outside of which is permitted. In Small,
the dissenters focused on the plain text to reach a reasonable result. But
as textualists readily emphasize, sometimes "the most literal
interpretation of a phrase is not always the most natural and reasonable
one." 36  A principled textualist cannot read statutory language in
32. Id. at 405.
33. As an aside, I note that these anomalies fall far short of absurdity (judges have a
special tool to deal with these sorts of situations, such as when Congress commits an obvious
scrivener's error in drafting a statute). See SCALIA, supra note 11, at 23-25.
34. BREYER, supra note 18, at 19 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY
109 (3d ed., 1960)).
35. SCALIA, supra note 11, at 24.
36. Campbell v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 410 F.3d 618, 623 (2005) (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting); see also Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("When someone asks, 'Do you use a cane?,' he is not inquiring whether you have your
grandfather's silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall."); SCALIA, supra note 11, at
24 ("[T]he good textualist is not a literalist ....").
A case which actually came before me illustrated this reality. In Campbell v. Allied Van
Lines, Inc., a family who contracted with a moving company to ship its household goods sued
the moving company when the goods arrived damaged. 410 F.3d at 619. A jury ruled in the
shippers' favor, and the trial judge granted them attorney's fees, which thereupon gave rise to
another dispute. Id.
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isolation.37  Sometimes, context renders the literal interpretation
unreasonable, and points the way to the most natural meaning, the
textualist's ultimate goal.
My second response to the criticism is that what some see as
wooden, I would characterize as predictable. And, unlike the traits that
make an effective legislature, predictability is among the greatest virtues
of a court of law.
In some ways, judicial interpretation can be seen as a conversation
between the courts and Congress.38 When courts interpret legislation,
they attach significance to Congress's linguistic habits. For instance, if
Congress uses the same phrase multiple times, courts are likely to
conclude that Congress's intended meaning was consistent. Similarly,
Congress responds to judicial decisions. If courts interpret a phrase
The shippers had sued the moving company under a federal statute, the Carmack
Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, which Congress enacted to preempt state law
claims against carriers and to facilitate the use of arbitration to resolve such claims. The
statute required carriers to offer shippers arbitration as a means of settlement, although it did
not require shippers to accept. 49 U.S.C. § 14708(a) (2000). The statute further allowed
shippers to collect attorney's fees from the carrier if three conditions were met: (1) the
shipper prevailed in court, (2) the shipper submitted a timely claim, and (3) "a decision
resolving the dispute was not rendered through arbitration" within the time allotted by the
statute. Id. § 14708(d)(3)(A).
In the case before our panel, the shippers declined arbitration, went straight to court, and
won a damage award. They argued that the statute still entitled them to attorney's fees, and
the majority agreed. It read the third provision of the statute literally and held that because
the text did not explicitly require shippers to arbitrate, shippers who proceeded to court could
still collect attorney's fees. Campbell, 410 F.3d at 621.
1 dissented. While I believed one could read the statute as the majority had, I believed
its literal reading was not the most natural or reasonable one. Id. at 623 (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting). In my view, the majority's literalism ignored the statutory context. Id. The
statute plainly indicated its design to promote and to facilitate arbitration. The attorney's
fees provision was located in a section entitled, "Dispute settlement program for household
goods carriers." 49 U.S.C. § 14708. Subsection (a) was entitled "offering shippers
arbitration," subsection (b) listed "arbitration requirements," subsection (c) detailed the
limitations on the use of arbitration documents, and subsection (d) provided the contested
attorney's fees provision. Id. § 14708(b)(5).
I must emphasize that I was not concerned with how Congress would have wanted our
court to interpret the statute. Instead, I believed my interpretation was compelled by what
Congress actually said in the surrounding statutory provisions.
37. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 499-500 (2002) (rejecting a "plain-
meaning argument [that] ignores the statutory setting"); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137,
145 (1995) ("'[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context."'
(quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
38. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 62-65 (1994) (explaining how judicial interpretation of
statutes responds to signaling from the legislature, even after the enactment of the provision
in question).
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differently than Congress intended, Congress will amend the statute and
clarify its meaning. Or, if courts interpret a phrase as Congress hoped,
Congress is likely to employ that phrase again, knowing that the two
branches now understand each other.
Such "conversation" comports with our governmental structure, but
it does require a common language if the two branches are to
understand each other. There are over 150 federal appellate judges and
over 750 federal trial judges. They come from all sorts of different
backgrounds and each of them, I would argue, has a slightly different
concept of what a reasonable member of Congress would think. But
when judges limit themselves to objective sources of Congress's intent
such as text, predictability is appreciably enhanced. While discretion is
not entirely foreclosed, I believe such approach enables judges to bring
consistency to statutory interpretation, in case after case, regardless of
the facts or the political values at stake.
In addition, judges who rely on text acknowledge that the "purpose"
behind most laws is far from singular. For a bill to become a law, a
majority of the 435 congressmen, a majority of the 100 senators, and the
President must all authorize its passage. Each player usually has his or
her own reasons for doing so. He or she might support the legislation
on its own merits, or because it brings resources to constituents, or
because strategists have tied its passage to the success of one of their
own pet projects. The legislative process is full of these compromises,
for better or worse. Indeed, as Otto Von Bismark once famously said,
legislation is like sausage, while both can be enjoyable products, the
process of making them is better left unseen.39
Beyond the fact that legislative purpose is not singular, there is no
objective source which captures such purposes except the law itself.
While congressional committees issue reports and legislators make
comments from the House and Senate floor, these isolated statements
cannot reliably capture the "purpose" of the hundreds of individuals
necessary to a statute's enactment. As judges, the only such indicator
we have is statutory text.
Of course, some respond, with lamentable accuracy, that many
members of Congress are not acutely aware of the linguistic niceties of
the great volumes of federal legislation. 0 Moreover, they point out that
39. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain
Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 265 n.92 (1998) (crediting Von Bismark with the
observation).
40. For example, the majority in Small v. United States, which held that Congress
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many statutes are drafted by congressional staffers rather than elected
representatives themselves. Thus, they argue that legislative history can
be just as useful as text when discerning Congress's intent.
But whether or not these critics accurately describe Congress's
habits, the ever-increasing volume of federal legislation does not
authorize judges to fill gaps they believe Congress was too busy or too
distracted to close.41 Indeed, to the extent some believe Congress is
overworked or simply incapable of carefully crafting each word that
becomes law, perhaps this indicates that our law has become overly
federalized, and that a robust central government, despite its benefits,
has important costs as well. Whatever the connection, the important
point is that the expansion of federal law does not authorize judges to
lend Congress a helping hand in legislating.
Our Constitution separates the legislative and judicial powers to
ensure that the people make the ultimate decisions. As a consequence,
on all questions, especially the close and difficult ones, it follows that the
judgments of our elected officials should prevail over the judgments of
our unelected judges, no matter how wise we are (or might think
ourselves to be).
III.
While judges are most frequently called upon to interpret statutory
text, the exercise of judicial power is never more highly scrutinized than
when the Supreme Court rules on the merits of a constitutional case.
This is to be expected, as the stakes are particularly high-while the
Court's interpretation of a federal statute can be overturned by a bare
majority of Congress with the consent of the President, a constitutional
decision by the Supreme Court can only be overturned through the
rather extraordinary remedy of a constitutional amendment. Yet there,
where the dangers of a judge-turned-lawmaker are particularly great,
intended "any court" to mean domestic courts only, noted the fact that the statute's "lengthy
legislative history" suggested Congress's ignorance of the implications of using such term as
support for the majority's decision to "correct" Congress's omission with its own solution.
544 U.S. 385, 393 (2005).
Of course, that construction of the legislative history was contested (as construction of
this ever-malleable source often is), as the majority conceded that a Conference Committee
explicitly rejected language that would have defined predicate crimes in terms of state and
federal offenses. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1501, 90th Cong., at 31 (1968)).
41. Indeed, as the dissent in Small replied, Congress's failure to consider the
consequences of using a particular word does not provide courts with license to disregard a
statute's "unambiguous meaning." Id. at 405 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Beecham v.
United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994)).
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the judge's temptation to reach beyond objective sources for the
Constitution's "purpose" or the socially desirable result is often greater
still. Thus, as the rivers of ink spilled over the Court's most
controversial decisions, such as Roe v. Wade, 2 Lawrence v. Texas,43 and
Lochner v. New York,44 can attest, constitutional cases render the need
for a principled judicial philosophy all the more essential.
A.
I believe one decision that receives comparatively little attention
(although I am sure you are all familiar with it) illustrates particularly
well the undesirable consequences of a judicial approach that strays
from text, structure, and history. As all followers of television police
dramas are aware, the Court in Miranda v. Arizona,45 held that the
government may not introduce into evidence at a defendant's trial any
statement he made to police during a custodial interrogation unless the
suspect was advised of the four now-famous Miranda warnings: "you
have the right to remain silent, any statement you make may be used
against you, you have the right to an attorney," and so on. 6 What those
television viewers may not be aware of, however, is that the Court's
decision in that case was truly unexpected.
In the decades before Miranda was heard, the Supreme Court had
applied a rule that a suspect's confession would be admissible at trial so
long as it was "voluntary," that is, not coerced by violence or threats of
violence by the police.47 The Court reasoned that the prohibition
against involuntary confessions was required by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which "assur[es] appropriate procedure
before liberty is curtailed or life is taken."48  Increasingly, however,
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
44. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. Id. at 467-69. Specifically, the Court held that unless some "other fully effective
means are devised" by the police, any suspect subject to police interrogation must be advised
of the following four warnings prior to questioning: (1) "that he has a right to remain silent";
(2) "that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him"; (3) that "he has
a right to the presence of an attorney"; and (4) that such attorney will be appointed if he
cannot afford to retain one. Id. at 444.
47. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936) (reversing defendant's conviction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the defendant's confession was obtained by police coercion); Aschraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (same).
48. Watts, 338 U.S. at 55.
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some Justices became concerned with the subtler pressures that arise
from police questioning and came to the view that police interrogation
can be "inherently coercive" even where the police never use or even
threaten violence. Thus, by the time the Miranda case reached the
Court, the majority of Justices had become quite skeptical of the
constitutionality of post-arrest confessions. 49 This was consistent with
the prevailing jurisprudence of the Court which, led by Chief Justice
Earl Warren, has been labeled by historians as the most aggressive in its
use of the judicial power to advance social progress, at least as the
majority of the Court defined that term. And, as a result, those awaiting
the decision in Miranda wondered aloud whether the Warren Court
would interpret the Constitution to prohibit the use of all post-arrest
confessions.
In a split decision, the Court in Miranda said yes: The Constitution
does prohibit the prosecution from using a suspect's confession against
him at trial unless the suspect was advised of four specific warnings
which it then proceeded to make up for the first time in this case. To the
surprise of all, including the litigants,0 the Court did not hold the
warnings to be required by the Due Process Clause, but by the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment (as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth). That Clause states that "[n]o person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."51
And, prior to Miranda, few had read its text as vesting suspects with any
49. This was perhaps best evidenced by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), in
which the Court made a profound shift away from reliance on the Due Process Clause. In
Escobedo, the Court held that state police violated a suspect's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel when they refused to allow his attorney to meet with him until they concluded a
station house interrogation of the suspect. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy, [among other rights], . . .the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). Thus, the Court's
reasoning, if not its result, was surprising, as never before had it been suggested that the
Amendment's protection attached to a suspect who was not yet indicted and thus not subject
to "formal, meaningful judicial proceedings," as the term "prosecutions" would suggest.
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 493 (Stewart, J., dissenting). To date, the question of when formal
judicial proceedings begin has still not been fully resolved. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
granted a petition for certiorari from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rothgery v. Gillespie to
consider precisely this question. See 491 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights had not yet attached when he was brought before a magistrate judge
because no prosecutor was involved in his arrest or his appearance before the magistrate).
50. The Self-Incrimination Clause was referred to only tangentially in multiple briefs
filed in the Court, which all focused almost exclusively on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel instead. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), 1966 WL 87732.
51. U.S. CONST. amend V (emphasis added).
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rights before formal criminal proceedings began. 2
The majority, however, confidently proclaimed that the warnings
were compelled by "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege [against self-incrimination]," because, in the Court's words,
that Clause requires government to "accord to the dignity and integrity
of its citizens," and "to respect the inviolability of the human
personality."53 In other words, the police must produce evidence "by its
own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling it from [the suspect's] own mouth.
5 4
Appealing to constitutional values at a very broad level of generality
(as courts often do when they wish to extend the Constitution's text into
uncharted waters), the Court emphasized the policy value of the
warnings in support of its novel holding. Chief Justice Warren noted
that when suspects confess during police interrogations, only police are
present. Even where there is no evidence that police employed coercive
tactics, he argued, such interrogations are cloaked in "secrecy," which
prevents the courts and the public from knowing what actually occurs in
the interrogation room.5 As such, he concluded that the Constitution
required police to advise suspects of their rights before the interrogation
begins.
The dissenters vehemently disagreed, finding nothing in the text of
the Constitution, its history, and nearly two hundred years of precedent
to portend the right newly discovered by the majority. As Justice White
explained, the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause says what it says-
"no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself'" 56-and when considered in light of "grammar and the
dictionary," appears to state nothing more than that no person shall be
52. The Court did tip its hand, at least in some ways, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), decided just shortly before Miranda. In the course of incorporating the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause against the states, Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court, suggested that "wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."' Id. at 7. Whether the innovation was born in
this phrase in Malloy or two years later in Miranda is of little moment, however, as it was an
innovation nonetheless-in its numerous decisions implicating the admissibility of confessions
in state and federal courts in the thirty years since Miranda, the Court never considered the
possibility that the Self-Incrimination Clause had a role to play in the analysis.
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 448.
56. id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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compelled to testify against himself in open court.57
Moreover, the dissenters viewed the social value of the Court's
decision as far less certain and worried that its reasoning would handcuff
law enforcement in fulfilling its duties. At a minimum, they believed the
Court's prior rule, that confessions could be admitted at trial if
"voluntary," provided adequate safeguards against police coercion and
that the Court's discovery of a new right in the Self-Incrimination
Clause was not supported by traditional tools of constitutional
interpretation. 8
On balance, I find myself in agreement with the dissenters'
reasoning and, more importantly, in its interpretive approach. In my
view, it is difficult to understand the majority's decision in Miranda as
anything more than a policy choice. Faced with a real and documented
threat of coercive police practices, the Court created a solution-it tore
away the cloak of secrecy it perceived as wrapped around the station
house and imposed a bright-line rule requiring police to inform a
suspect expressly of four enumerated and previously unarticulated rights
(and to obtain the suspect's affirmative waiver of those rights) before
questioning. Depending on one's view, this might have been a
reasonable solution to the temptations of police interrogation. Yet
judges, as envisioned by Montesquieu and the Founders, are not
responsible for creating solutions to social problems, however great.
Instead, they are only asked to determine what our Constitution
explicitly requires.
B.
Now that more than four decades have passed since Miranda was
decided, let's examine the consequences of the Court's decision and its
implications for the separation of powers. Subsequent to Miranda, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts scaled back the scope of that decision
without explicitly overturning its holding. For example, the Court held
that while a suspect's unwarned confession could not be admitted as
57. Id. at 526-27. Moreover, Justice White found "very little in the surrounding
circumstances" of the Constitution's adoption or historical practice "which would give the
... provision any broader meaning," id. at 527, and further noted that "literally thousands" of
convictions upheld under the Court's voluntariness test would fail under its new rule, id. at
529-31.
58. As Justice Stewart lamented, "'This Court is forever adding new stories to the
temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too
many is added."' Id. at 526 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157, 181 (1943)).
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direct evidence against him, it could still be used for impeachment if he
testified. 9 Later, the Court held that police confronting a public safety
emergency could question a suspect without reading him his rights and
still use his confession at trial.6" In these and several other decisions, the
Court characterized the Miranda warnings as a "prophylactic"
protection for the right against self-incrimination which were "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution."6
So, if the warnings were not constitutionally required, why couldn't
Congress reject their use through legislation? Well, Congress sought to
do precisely that in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which restored the
voluntariness test and removed the requirement that warnings be given
to defendants charged with federal crimes. Section 3501 was enacted
only two years after Miranda, but the Justice Department declined to
enforce it until 1999, when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the statute indeed overruled Miranda.
6 2
The Supreme Court quickly granted certiorari, and was prepared
finally to confront Congress's determination to overrule Miranda in the
case of Dickerson v. United States.63 In a 7-2 decision, the Court
concluded that even though the Miranda warnings were not
constitutionally required, Miranda was nevertheless a "constitutional
rule" with "constitutional underpinnings" which Congress could not
overturn by statute.64
Now that decision was quite unusual. Indeed, the concept of a
constitutional rule with constitutional underpinnings was rather
unprecedented, and some suggested that Dickerson was the product of a
Court that had determined that even though the warnings were not
constitutionally required, they had become too embedded in our social
fabric to undo.
Whether or not these observers accurately described the Court's
thinking, the lesson Dickerson teaches is that policy choices by judges
are enduring. The Miranda Court's policy decision was precedent for
forty-four years and Dickerson has now affirmed that only the
extraordinary remedy of a constitutional amendment could displace it as
governing law. Even a Court that had long questioned the
59. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
60. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
61. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
62. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
63. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
64. Id. at 439, 440 n.5.
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constitutional necessity of Miranda's holding was unwilling to overrule
its own act of judicial legislation-possibly because stare decisis and our
national familiarity with the warnings made the stakes too high.
65
Perhaps the Miranda Court made the wisest policy choice possible.
But in a government of separated powers, social policy should be
irrelevant. The important result of Miranda is that voters and legislators
no longer need to concern themselves with police interrogation because
the courts have solved that problem for them. I submit that there are
certain fundamental rights, clearly defined in our Constitution's text,
which that document requires the courts to protect in such manner. But
as for the remainder, a government of separated powers entrusts the
people to devise the rules by which they will be governed. As my
colleague Judge Andrew Kleinfeld so eloquently wrote, "That a
question is important does not imply that it is constitutional. The
Founding Fathers did not establish the United States as a democratic
republic so that elected officials would decide trivia, while all great
questions would be decided by the judiciary., 66
IV.
In conclusion, let me emphasize that in our system of government,
the people govern. Through their representatives, they make decisions
that become law. Our Constitution entrusts judges to interpret these
laws, and to refrain from correcting Congress's missteps where
necessary (or where the judges believe it to be).
In my view, judges who approach this task by focusing on text and
other objective sources are most faithful to this responsibility. On the
other hand, judges who instead interpret a law in search of its purpose
or the "best" social result morph themselves into legislators and
encroach upon the role of Congress.
We federal judges are appointed for life. We are neither directly
chosen nor directly accountable to the people. And for good reason.
The Founders believed that our democracy required a judiciary that
would fairly and accurately apply the law. They also believed it
necessary to insulate judges from the political pressures that face elected
65. See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (successive interrogations); United
States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (admissibility of derivative evidence obtained as a result
of a Miranda violation); United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2005)
(special safeguards for foreign defendants); United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534 (9th Cir.
1998) (same).
66. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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representatives. Yet these very same pressures enhance the
performance of legislators. If legislators wish to be re-elected, they must
be attentive to their constituents' concerns, and accountability is thereby
assured. But when judges deviate from text to make law, the people
cannot hold them similarly accountable, short of the cumbersome
process of impeachment.
Even further, such judges relieve the people's elected
representatives of their own responsibilities. When judges interpret law
by searching for its purpose, courts become the fora in which our
national policy is made. Knowing this, Congress can wait for the
Supreme Court to bail it out of tough, or simply unpopular, decisions
and congressmen and congresswomen can focus instead on posturing for
re-election rather than rolling up their sleeves to legislate on the
questions that truly matter.
In such an environment, it should be no surprise that the battles over
the confirmation of judges have become so fierce. After all, when
judges are viewed as policymakers, the confirmation process is no longer
an effort to validate the credentials and temperament of the potential
jurist but becomes an exercise to test the legislative policy instincts of
the nominee who, if he cannot be trusted to implement the prevailing
views of a Senate majority, can be rejected on such grounds alone.
Overshadowing the multitude of important questions facing the nation,
the question of whom we nominate to the federal bench, especially to
the Supreme Court, becomes a political debate of the highest
consequence, as judges, rather than elected representatives, become the
authors of our nation's laws.
Our Constitution, however, creates a government of separated
powers. It reserves to the people the power to create the laws under
which we live, and it entrusts the judiciary with the far more limited task
of interpreting them. Our Constitution leaves the responsibility of
making law to "we, the people," through an elected Congress, and I
believe it is indeed "we, the people," not "we, the judges," who must
fully exercise it.
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